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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Section 78-2-
2(3)0) of the Utah Code. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing;... 
(2) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Plaintiffs and Appellees in this action are owners of five-acre lots in the 
Rocky Top Subdivision in Erda, Tooele County, Utah. With one exception, the Plaintiffs 
purchased their lots from the Defendants and Appellants, Edward Clayton Warr and 
Hazel Warr (the "Warrs").1 The Warrs had advertised the availability of the lots through 
1
 Plaintiffs Wayne D. Lewis and Miriam Lewis purchased their property in 1997 
from Howard A. Crittenden and Lora Lee Crittenden Trial Exh. 119. The Crittendens 
purchased the property from the Warrs. (Trial Exh. 34). The Lewises have received a quit 
470081vl 1 
newspaper advertisements and signs announcing the availability of "five-acre ranchettes, 
water, utilities . . . " Trial Exh. 60. In their sales pitch to Plaintiffs, the Warrs represented 
that, with the purchase of each lot, water sufficient to irrigate five acres would be 
provided and delivered to the Subdivision from the Rose Spring, in which the Warrs had 
an ownership interest. A pipeline from the spring to the Subdivision was already in 
place, but was in poor repair. 
Although the deeds to the lots did not convey the water rights, the Warrs 
repeatedly acknowledged their obligation to provide the water and deliver it to the 
Subdivision, and assured the Plaintiffs that they would do so as soon as it became 
possible.2 However, various problems (discussed more fully below), prevented the 
Warrs from delivering the water for a number of years after the lots were sold. Id. See 
alsoR. 954 at 103. 
In reliance on the Warrs' representations, the Plaintiffs purchased the lots, built 
family homes on them, and made valuable improvements to the land. In addition, 
several Plaintiffs participated, both financially and physically, in the installation of a 
distribution pipeline to deliver the water to their respective lots. They did so with the 
claim deed from the Crittendens, entitling them to all of the Crittendens' "right, title, and 
interest in any and all water or water rights associated with" Lot 10 of the Rocky Top 
Subdivision. Trial Exh. 131. 
2
 Indeed, Plaintiff Wayne Reynolds was reassured by the Warrs at the closing on his 
property that, notwithstanding the content of the deed, the water would be conveyed and 
delivered as soon as certain obstacles were resolved. R. 954 at 50. 
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understanding that they already owned the rights to the water. Thereafter, however, 
instead of conveying or providing the water as represented, the Warrs approached certain 
Plaintiffs in late 1995, offering to sell them quit claim deeds to the water rights for 
$2,500-$5,000. Plaintiffs, knowing that they had already purchased the water, refused to 
pay the additional money. To date, the Warrs have failed to deliver the water from Rose 
Spring as promised, or to convey the water rights, leaving the Plaintiffs with no choice 
but to seek judicial relief. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action on January 28, 1999. R. 1-41. The 
Warrs filed a motion to dismiss based on arguments under the statute of frauds and 
statute of limitations. The motion was denied. The Warrs later moved for summary 
judgment under the same theories. That motion was also denied. R. 72-96, 197-98,233-
449, 583. The matter was tried to the Honorable David S. Young on March 13-15,2000. 
In their Trial Brief and at the beginning of the trial, the Warrs moved to exclude all 
evidence that contradicted the terms of the written deeds to the lots. They did so only on 
the basis of the parol evidence rule.3 Judge Young denied that motion. R. 953 at 7. At 
3
 The Warrs have indicated that they moved to exclude such evidence at the beginning 
of trial under the doctrine of merger and the parol evidence rule. Appellant's Brief at 5. The 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the record shows that the motion was based only on the 
parol evidence rule. R. 953 at 6-7. The Warrs9 trial brief never mentioned the doctrine of 
merger, nor did the pretrial order. Moreover, the transcript pages the Warrs cite state only 
the following on the issue: 
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the conclusion of trial, the court found for Plaintiffs and against the Warrs, and ordered 
that the Warrs convey to the Plaintiffs sufficient water to irrigate their properties as 
established by the evidence. R. 955 at 146-150. Plaintiffs, as directed by the court, 
prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. R. 918-937. The 
Defendants objected to the proposed Judgment on the basis that the Judgment required 
the Warrs to convey an excessive amount of water, but their objections were denied by 
Judge Young, who signed the Judgmenton April 24, 2000. R. 854-913, 916-37. The 
Warrs thereafter filed this appeal. 
MS. DRAGOO: 
THE COURT: 
MS. DRAGOO: 
THE COURT: 
Your Honor, we had one other preliminary matter. 
Yes. 
That involves the basis. The case in chief is based on oral 
evidence, and the best evidence in the record right now are 
warranty deeds. And under the parol evidence rule, before the 
court can consider the parol evidence that would be in the case 
in chief of the plaintiff, you must make a finding that the 
warranty deeds were not in integration of the parties; and 
secondly, that the warranty deeds are somehow ambiguous. 
And so we would continue to make that objection. 
That objection may be reserved for the record. I don't have any 
objection to having that a continuing objection throughout the 
course of the trial. I think it's going to be important for me to 
hear, and I have had preliminary motions that have caused me 
to believe I needed to hear the witnesses. 
MS. DRAGOO: Thank you, your Honor. 
R. 963 at 6-7. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts were established by the evidence at trial, in the record, and by 
stipulation of the parties:4 
1. In or about 1983, the Warrs purchased from Terracor approximately 110 
acres of real property, located in Tooele County, which property was subsequently 
subdivided into five-acre residential lots, known collectively as the Rocky Top 
Subdivision (the "Subdivision"). Trial Exh. 1,2,11,17. 
2. In conjunction with the acquisition of this real property, the Warrs also 
acquired from Terracor a 40% interest in rights in certain water originating at a spring 
located approximately one mile from the Subdivision, known as "Rose Spring" or 
"Bryan Springs." Id. There was an existing pipeline that ran from the spring to the 
Subdivision. R. 809. 
3. To facilitate this development, on October 11, 1983, the Warrs filed with 
the Office of the Utah State Engineer (the "State Engineer") an application to change the 
place of use of the Water (1.0 cubic foot per second) to the Subdivision. Trial Exh. 3. 
4. On November 2, 1984, the State Engineer approved Change Application 
No. 1-12993, thereby approving the use of the water for the irrigation of the Subdivision. 
Trial Exh. 7. The Warrs were given until October 31,1988 to put the water to beneficial 
use. See Id. 
4
 As discussed in more detail below, the Warrs' statement of facts is taken almost 
entirely from the uncontested facts in the pretrial order which, of course, does not reflect the 
evidence determinative of the contested facts. Defendants have, therefore, utterly failed to 
marshall the evidence as is required. 
5. In November, 1984, the Warrs presented their proposal for developing the 
Rocky Top Subdivision to the Tooele County Planning Commission. Trial Exh. 11. In 
their presentation, the Warrs indicated that they intended to use the water for irrigation of 
the proposed Subdivision. Trial Exh. 13. 
6. Thereafter, the Warrs commenced the advertisement and sale of five-acre 
lots in the Subdivision. Certain newspaper advertising announced the sale of "five-acre 
ranchettes, water, utilities . . ." Trial Exh. 60. 
7. The Warrs sold some of the lots to their children. In 1985, the Warrs 
conveyed Lots 4 and 5 of the Rocky Top Subdivision to their daughters and sons-in-law, 
James and Brenda Baldwin and Cecil and Teresa Jones, respectively. The Warranty 
Deeds that conveyed Lots 4 and 5 did not convey water rights. Trial Exh. 18,19. In 
1986, the Warrs conveyed Lot 3 of the Rocky Top Subdivision to their son, Howard 
Warr, and his wife, Linda Warr. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 3 did not convey 
water rights. Trial Exh. 29. In 1988, the Warrs conveyed Lot 7 of the Rocky Top 
Subdivision to their daughter, Cathy Warr Johnson. The Warranty Deed that conveyed 
Lot 7 did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 16. Finally, in 1991, the Warrs conveyed 
Lot 11 of the Rocky Top Subdivision to their son, Edward Kyler Warr and his wife, Lisa 
G. Warr. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 11 did not mention water rights. Trial 
Exh. 68. 
8. The Warrs verbally represented to Plaintiffs that, although they would need 
to obtain a permit to drill a well for culinary water, rights to water sufficient to irrigate 
4*7nnfii*/i O 
five acres would be included in the purchase of the lots, and that this water would be 
delivered from the Rose Spring to the Subdivision through an existing pipeline by 
gravitational flow. R. 661; R. 953 at 42-43, 76, 91, 132-134, 157-158, 173-175, 195-
196; R. 954 at 6-9, 18,29-30,46-47. In addition, the Warrs pointed out the Rose Spring 
to the buyers. R. 953 at 91. 
9. Commencing in January, 1986 the Plaintiffs purchased five-acre lots in the 
Subdivision from the Warrs.5 Trial Exh. 24, 34,43, 54, 56, 62, 75. In each case, the 
Plaintiffs (or with regard to the Lewises' claims, the prior lot owners, the Crittendens) 
were informed by the Warrs that the purchase price of the lot included rights to sufficient 
water, delivered, to irrigate their five-acre lots. R. 953 at 42-43, 76, 91, 132-134, 157-
158, 173-175, 195-196; R. 954 at 6-9, 18, 29-30,46-47. 
10. In their dealings with Melvin and Sandra Spears, who purchased Lot 6 of 
the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1986, the Warrs stated that sufficient water to irrigate five 
acres would be provided and delivered as part of the purchase price of Lot 6. R. 934; R. 
953 at 42, 76. The Warrs further indicated that the water would be delivered through the 
existing railroad pipeline to the Subdivision, and that a pipeline would need to be 
installed to deliver the water to the individual lots. R. 953 at 43. At the time that the 
Spears purchased the lot, the back of the lot was green and highly saturated, with 
irrigation water running on the lot. R. 953 at 44. The Spears drilled a culinary well and 
built their home on Lot 6. R. 953 at 49, 52. The culinary well provides water sufficient 
5
 Plaintiffs Wayne D. Lewis and Merriam Lewis purchased their lot in 1997 from the 
original purchasers, Howard A. Crittenden and Lora Lee Crittenden. Trial Exh. 119. 
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for their domestic needs and the irrigation of one quarter acre of land. R. 953 at 51. R. 
934. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 6 to the Spears did not mention water rights. 
Trial Exh. 21. 
11. In their dealings with Howard and Loralee Crittenden, who purchased Lot 
10 of the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1987, the Warrs represented that sufficient irrigation 
water to irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the Rose Spring, and 
that the water was included in the price of the lot. R. 954 at 28-30. In addition, Clayton 
Warr showed Mr. Crittenden flowing water on the back of the lot. R. 954 at 29. The 
Crittendens drilled a culinary well and moved a mobile home onto Lot 10, where they 
lived until they sold the property to Wayne and Miriam Lewis in 1997. R. 954 at 19. 
The culinary well provided sufficient water for their domestic purposes, some stock 
watering, and the inrigation of one quarter acre of land. R. 671-672. The Warranty Deed 
that conveyed Lot 10 to the Crittendens did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 34. 
12. In their dealings with Wayne Reynolds, who purchased Lot 2 of the Rocky 
Top Subdivision in 1988, the Warrs represented that with the purchase of the lot, 
sufficient water to irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the Rose 
Spring. R. 954 at 45-47. The Warrs further stated that the water would be delivered to 
the Subdivision through the existing railroad pipeline, but that a pipeline would have to 
be installed to bring the water across Lot 2. R. 954 at 45-47. The Warranty Deed that 
conveyed Lot 2 to Mr. Reynolds did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 43. At the 
closing on Lot 2, Hazel Warr informed him that, because of problems with Max 
8 
Bleazard, the Warrs could not convey and deliver the irrigation water at that time, but 
that eventually the water would be provided. R. 954 at 50. 
13. After acquiring Lot 2, Mr. Reynolds did not immediately drill a culinary 
well, due to financial constraints. R. 954 at 55. In or around 1995, the State Engineer 
imposed a moratorium on new appropriations of water in the Erda area. R. 954 at 56-57. 
Mr. Reynolds was therefore prevented from drilling a culinary well on Lot 2. Id. With 
neither culinary nor irrigation water, Mr. Reynolds has been unable to use or sell his 
property. R. 954 at 55. 
14. In their dealings with Clifford and Tonja Ruben, who purchased Lot 9 of 
the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1990, the Warrs represented that sufficient water to 
irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered with the purchase of lot. R. 953 at 
91. At that time, some water was already being delivered to the lot by a pipeline from the 
Rose Spring. R. 953 at 92. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 9 did not mention 
water rights. Trial Exh. 56. The Rubens drilled a culinary well and built a home on Lot 
9. R. 953 at 98, 100. With their culinary well, the Rubens are able to do some stock 
watering and irrigate one quarter acre of land. R. 953 at 99. 
15. In their dealings with Fred and Karen Martinez, who purchased Lot 1 of 
the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1990, the Warrs represented that, with the purchase price 
of the lot, water sufficient to irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the 
Rose Spring. R. 953 at 195. The Warrs stated that the water would be delivered to the 
Subdivision through the existing railroad pipeline, and that a line would be installed to 
47008W1 9 
bring the water across the Lots. R. 953 at 195-196. The Warranty Deed that conveyed 
Lot 1 did not mention water rights. Trial Exh. 62 The Martinezes built their home on 
Lot 1. R. 954 at 13. With their culinary well, the Martinezes are able to irrigate one 
quarter acre of land. R. 953 at 204. 
16. In their dealings with Gary and Heidi Jo Thomas, who purchased Lot 8 of 
the Rocky Top Subdivision in 1992, the Warrs represented that sufficient water to 
irrigate five acres would be provided and delivered from the Rose Spring as part of the 
purchase price of the lot, R. 953 at 173-174, and that the water would be provided once 
the dispute with Bleazard was settled. At the time of purchase, there was water on the 
back of Lot 8. Trial Exh. 75. The Warranty Deed that conveyed Lot 8 did not mention 
water rights. R. 953 at 180. 
17. The Plaintiffs and the Crittendens purchased their lots with the intent of 
irrigating them. Fred and Karen Martinez wanted to grow alfalfa. R. 954 at 7. Clifford 
and Tonja Ruben also wanted to grow alfalfa. R. 756. Heidi Thomas had horses and 
wanted to grow hay. R. 953 at 169, 181. Wayne Reynolds planned to raise game birds 
on the property. R. 954 at 55. He knew he needed water. Id. 
18. In the purchase of their lots, the Plaintiffs relied upon the Warrs' 
representations regarding the irrigation water. Every Plaintiff, as well as the Crittendens, 
testified that they would not have purchased the property absent the Warrs' 
representations regarding irrigation water. R. 953 at 46, 53-55, 79, 94,119,184,199-
200, 206; R. 954 14, 18, 30, 51-52, 55-56. 
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19. Representations and promises regarding the water were made, not just by 
Clayton Warr, but by Hazel Warr as well. R. 953 at 79-80, 195-196; R. 954 at 6-9,27, 
45-46, 50. Loralee Critten testified that the Warrs acted as "more or less equal partners." 
R.954at27. 
20. In April, 1987 the Warrs were sued in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Tooele County, State of Utah, Civil No. 87-058 in an action challenging their ownership 
of the water. In defense of this claim, the Warrs filed an affidavit signed by both of them 
under oath. Trial Exh. 40. In relevant part, the affidavit states: 
We filed Application No. a-12993 (15-3020) with the Utah State Engineer to 
change the point of diversion, place and nature of use of our 40% interest in 
Diligence Claims 1260 to facilitate the use of such water for irrigation, domestic, 
and stock watering uses on our property and on the Rocky Top Subdivision. 
We subdivided and platted eleven five-acre parcels of our property within Section 
26, Township 2 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, Tooele 
County, Utah as the Rocky Top Subdivision, recorded August 30, 1985 at Book 
232, Page 344, official records of the Tooele County Recorder. 
We subdivided and platted the Rocky Top Subdivision with the intent of selling 
platted lots with water developed from our interest in the Rose Spring, in reliance 
on the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision of November 2, 1984. 
We have sold six of the eleven lots in the Rocky Top Subdivision upon our 
representation that gravity flow Water would be provided to such lots from our 
interest in the Rose Spring. 
Due to the pending quiet title action concerning the Rose Spring filed by Dale 
Max Bleazard, J.N. Ward Engineering has been unable to construct the planned 
metering and diversion system for the Rose Spring and we have been unable to 
provide gravity flow Water through such facilities to the Rocky Top Subdivision. 
Id. When questioned about the affidavit at trial, Hazel Warr explained, "I suppose Pm 
perjured." R. 954 at 95. 
21. At the time that the Plaintiffs purchased their lots and repeatedly thereafter, 
the Warrs informed them that delivery of the water was being held up by the adverse 
claims to the water by Mr. Bleazard. R. 953 at 53, 101, 181, 202; R. 954 at 50. Certain 
of the Plaintiffs were also informed that certain improvements to the pipeline from the 
Rose Spring to the Subdivision had to be made in order to increase the flow of water for 
use by the lot owners. R. 953 at 53; R. 954 at 46-47. Later, they were assured that 
"Loveless is working on the deeds, and things should be taken care of really soon." R. 
953 at 183. 
22- As noted above, the lot owners along the south side of the Subdivision 
were also told that a distribution line from the point at which the line from the spring 
entered the Subdivision to their lots would have to be installed. R. 954 at 46. 
23- On June 17, 1988 the Warrs, through their attorney, Denise A. Dragoo, 
filed a written application with the State Engineer, signed under oath, seeking an 
extension of the time for filing proof of beneficial use of the water from October 31, 
1988 to October 31, 1991. Trial Exh. 38. This extension was approved by the State 
Engineer. This application referenced the Warrs9 efforts to perform certain tasks 
necessary to deliver the water from the Rose Spring to the Subdivision. Trial Exh. 37. 
24. In June of 1990, the Bleazard litigation against the Warrs was dismissed 
without prejudice. Trial Exh. 59. Thereafter, Bleazard continued to fight with the 
19 
Warrs over the use of the Rose Spring water, threatening further legal action until 
approximately 1993 or 1994. R. 954 at 115. 
25. In the summer of 1991, the Warrs began the installation of a pipeline to 
distribute water from the railroad pipeline to the lots along the southern boundary of the 
Subdivision. R. 953 at 53-54, 199. 
26. In reliance on the promises made by the Warrs, Wayne Reynolds, the 
Spears, and the Martinezes participated in the cost and physical installation of the water 
distribution line from the northeast comer of the Subdivision where the existing pipeline 
from the Rose Spring enters the Subdivision to their respective lots. R. 953 at 53-55, 
199-200; R. 954 at 51-52. After this pipeline was installed, the amount of water 
deliverable to the Subdivision remained very limited by the capacity of the railroad 
pipeline. R. 668, 928. 
27. On October 24, 1991, the Warrs filed and signed under oath a request for 
an additional extension of time for the filing of proof of beneficial use of the water from 
October 31, 1991 to October 31, 1993. Trial Exh. 71. In this request, the Warrs offered 
the following reason for an extension: "Work in progress on waterline. Work still to be 
done. I have spent approximately $6,000 on waterlines and will spend $4,000 more 
before completed." Id. A substantial portion of these funds were supplied by Plaintiffs. 
R. 953 at 53-55, 199-200; R. 954 at 51-52, 142-143. This request for an extension was 
granted, and the Warrs were given until October 31,1994 to put the water to beneficial 
use. Id. 
28. In 1993, Mr. Bleazard finally agreed to allow the Warrs to transfer the 
water rights into the Plaintiffs9 wells. R. 954 at 103; R. 667. The Warrs, however, 
continued to provide excuses for their failure to convey the water rights and deliver the 
water. R. 953 at 53, 101, 173-175, 181, 202. 
29. On July 12, 1994 the Warrs, without additional compensation, conveyed by 
quit-claim deed to their son Howard and his wife, who owned one of the lots in the 
Subdivision, rights to seven and one-half percent (7.5.%) of their interest in the Water for 
the purpose of irrigating their son's five-acre lot. Trial Exh. 98; R. 954 at 145-146. 
Similar quit-claim deeds were given to the Warrs' other children who resided in the 
Subdivision, also without additional compensation.6 Trial Exh. 97; R. 954 at 145-146. 
30. On September 12, 1994, the Warrs filed a request with the State Engineer 
for another extension of time for filing proof of beneficial use of the water from October 
31, 1994 to October 31, 1996. Trial Exh. 100. In support of this request, the Warrs 
stated as follows: "Working on Water Line. Increase Water flow from 30 gallon minute 
to 60 gallon minute, which would be my 25 percent of Water Right." Id. This statement 
was in writing and signed under oath. The Warrs9 request for an extension was granted 
by the State Engineer. Id. 
31. At various times after purchasing their lots, Plaintiffs inquired as to why 
the water had not been delivered, and were repeatedly told that the water was tied up 
6
 Although Hazel Warr admitted at trial that her children who purchased lots in the 
Subdivision were told they would have irrigation water, the warranty deeds conveying the 
properties to her children are, like those given to the Plaintiffs, silent on the subject of 
irrigation water. R. 954 at 72; Trial Exh. 18, 19,29. 
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because of Bleazard, or that the Warrs were working on the pipeline, or that the deeds 
were being prepared. R. 953 at 53, 58, 101, 181-182, 202. At all times prior to 1995, the 
Warrs continued to assure Plaintiffs that they would provide the water as soon as 
possible. R. 953 at 62, 181-182. 
32. In or about 1995, the Warrs told their son, Howard Warr, that they had 
decided they were not going to convey to the Plaintiffs the promised water rights without 
the payment of additional money. R. 953 at 146. When Howard protested that the 
Plaintiffs had already paid for the water rights, the Warrs did not deny that the original 
deals had included water rights, and delivery of the water. Instead, as Howard testified: 
his father's comeback in all of it was 'they have nothing in writing", R. 953 at 151, and 
his mother's was "bring on the lawyers." R. 953 at 156. 
33. Thereafter, the Warrs began informing the Plaintiffs that quit-claim deeds 
had been prepared to convey the water rights as originally agreed. R. 953 at 59-61, 101-
102, 183, 204-206; R. 954 at 18-19, 53-54. However, the Warrs now stated, for the first 
time, that the Plaintiffs would have to pay an additional $2,500-$5,000 per lot for the 
water rights, stating that they "had to make some money on this." Id. 
34. The first set of quit claim deeds Mr. Loveless prepared at the Warrs' 
instruction, in the names of Plaintiffs and the Warrs' children, would have conveyed 
"Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of [the Warrs' water right], which represents .079 
cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs." Trial Exh. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88. 
(A subsequent set of deeds was later prepared, cutting the amount of water to "Seven and 
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one half percent (7.5%) of [the Warrs' water right]... which equals a flow of .075 cfs in 
Rose Spring." Trial Exh. 90, 92, 97, 98.) 
35. Every Plaintiff who was approached (the Rubens were never approached 
by the Warrs, but learned from Heidi Thomas that the Warrs were attempting to sell the 
deeds for $2500), as well as the Crittendens, refused to pay for the deeds, saying that they 
had already paid for the water rights with the purchase of their lots. R. 953 at 59-61, 
101-102,183, 204-206; R. 954 at 18-19, 53-54. 
36. When Clayton Warr approached Howard Crittenden about purchasing the 
quit claim deed, he offered to take Mr. Crittenden's horse trailer in lieu of the $2500. 
The Crittendens were unable to sell the horse trailer to the Warrs because they had 
already sold it to their daughter. Loralee Crittenden testified that her daughter purchased 
the horse trailer in 1995. R. 954 at 18-19. 
37. When Hazel Warr informed Heidi Thomas that the water would cost 
$2500, Heidi responded, "I'm a single Mom. I can't come up with $2500. What am I 
going to do?" R. 953 at 183. She hung up and called Tonja Ruben. Id. Ms. Thomas 
placed this conversation in October of 1995. R. 953 at 182. When asked how she knew 
the date, Ms. Thomas replied that it was after her husband, Gary, had moved out in 
August of 1995. R. 953 at 182. 
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38. Fred Martinez was living in his home at the Rocky Top Subdivision when 
he received a phone call from Clayton Warr offering to sell him the quit claim deed to the 
water rights for $5,000. Fred said "No way" and hung up the phone. Mr. Warr called 
back later and said the price would be $2500. Again, Fred refused. R. 953 at 204-206. 
Karen Martinez testified that they moved into their home at the Rocky Top Subdivision 
in November of 1995. R. 954 at 12. 
39. Wayne Reynolds, Melvin Spears, and Sandy Spears all testified that the 
Warrs first told them that they were going to have pay an additional $2500 for the quit 
claim deeds in 1995. R. 953 at 59-60, 78; R. 954 at 53. 
40. When the Plantiffs protested that they had already paid for the water rights, 
the Warrs responded by telling them "You don't have anything in writing" and "bring on 
the lawyers". R. 953 at 183. The Warrs refused to deliver the deeds.7 
41. On September 4, 1996 the Warrs filed with the State Engineer a request for 
yet another extension of time to prove the beneficial use of the water from October 31, 
1996 to November, 1998. Trial Exh. 111. In support of this request, the Warrs 
represented the following, again in writing and under oath: 
We are in the process of upgrading the "source" water line in order to use 
100 percent of water rights. We need additional time to accomplish 
upgrading the source line (currently 4") to a new 12" line. The line is 
7The deeds were actually prepared, and some were signed by the Warrs. Trial Exh. 
80-83, 86, 90, 92. (Appellee's Supplemental Appendix at "A"). 
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estimated to be approximately one mile in length requiring upgrade. The 
"place of use" water lines have been developed. 
Id. This request for an extension was granted by the State Engineer. Id. 
42. In 1997, Howard and Loralee Crittenden sold Lot 10 of the Rocky Top 
Subdivision, together with the mobile home thereon, to Wayne and Miriam Lewis. Trial 
Exh. 119. The Crittendens made clear that they were not selling irrigation water with the 
property. Trial Exh. 115. However, their listing agent, Vonna Warr, told the Lewises 
that they could purchase irrigation water sufficient to irrigate five acres from the Warrs 
for a one-time fee of $2500. R. 954 at 33. Mr. Lewis did not immediately purchase the 
water rights, because he lacked the money to do so. R. 954 at 37. He later learned that 
the Crittendens had purchased irrigation water with their purchase of Lot 10, but that it 
had not been delivered. R. 954 at 40. Accordingly, he did not purchase the irrigation 
water from the Warrs, but joined in this action. R. 954 at 40. In December of 1999, the 
Crittendens conveyed to the Lewises, by quit claim deed, any and all water rights which 
they had in association with Lot 10 of the Rocky Top Subdivision. Trial Exh. 131. 
43. In September 1998, the Warrs filed an additional Request for 
Reinstatement and Extension of Time, seeking to extend the time for proving beneficial 
use of the water until October, 2002. Trial Exh. 124. 
44. After the Warrs began trying to sell the quit claim deeds to the Plaintiffs, 
Howard Warr had a conversation with his father, Clayton Warr, regarding the irrigation 
water, in which he told his father "You can't be double selling this water." R. 953 at 
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151 Iloward testified: "I was arguing with him, asking him what his word was worth to 
him and I was asking m> dad v\ lliiiil1 n 11 was his word and telling him you couldn't 
i d u i b l f s e l l t h i s H i i t c i iill11 iinr n r m i i oinr l i iU' ls in 111 n11 ill u if,1- i n n i i y u 1 i )oi l i i i i | j iiiiiii 
* i' i Itlng." " Id. 
15 To date, the Warrs have failed and refused either to convey to the Plaintiffs 
llicii all"! 11,..Ill i nr I . uMtipkk: the delivery systei. ;;.. •* llic Uose Spring to the \\.-. I y 
Top Subdivision. 
46 \ I lrial, the Warrs' expert witness, Mr, Vein Loveless, testified that .079 
M
 i ^ uie amour* ^f water the State Engineer's office requires for the irrigation >r H ; 
i v--ciw^ lurUici icsniicu inat 
die amount ui u* tiuu water tivv 4i can draw from, their * nlinnn w«iils I (II"' H .1 
I ,' n „ 11 in" i with ,079 cfs, would allow the in igation of five acres of land. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
i preponderance of the evidence" 
presented, that the Plaintiffs were entitled to the irritfnliun wain llicy soil U <>SS .nil 
146. In so concluding, the court properly held that the doctrines of merger, the parol 
evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations did not preclude such a 
irsnh I In (ioctiiiif ill merger n nmpimi, iinni in liii. nhi nrcuusu IIIC panics intended 
that the Wans' performance would not be complete upon the execution of a wnmml v 
deed Rather, all parties intended, as represented, that the Warrs would convey to them 
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and deliver the water to the Subdivision at some point after the warranty deeds to the lots 
were provided. In addition, as the Waits are quick to point out, the warranty deeds do 
not reference irrigation water. The water does not pertain to the same subject as does the 
deed. Thus, the doctrine of merger does not apply. 
Moreover, the trial court did not err in determining that the parol evidence rule did 
not bar Plaintiffs' evidence or claims. On the question of whether a contract constituted 
a complete integration of the parties' understanding, all relevant evidence is admissible. 
The court did not err in allowing such evidence for that purpose. The trial court 
expressly found, as required, that the warranty deeds were not integrated. Having made 
that determination, it was not improper for the court to find, based upon the evidence, in 
favor of Plaintiffs. Further, the Warrs failed to marshal the evidence on whether the 
deeds constituted an integration of the parties' understanding, and thus have not 
adequately challenged the trial court's finding. 
The trial court also properly held that the statute of frauds does not bar Plaintiffs' 
claims, due to the doctrine of part performance. In addition to acts of part performance 
by the Plaintiffs, the court cited "strong independent evidence" of the oral contracts, 
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of exclusive referability. The statute of frauds 
should not be made the means of perpetrating a fraud or gross injustice. In this case, as 
the court found, the compelling evidence demonstrates that application of the statute of 
frauds as a bar to Plaintiffs' claims would work just such a result. Again, the Warrs 
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larshal the evidence support ing the trial cour t ' s findings as to acts of part • 
ng independent evidence ot" llic oral contracts . • 
The W a r r s ' statute o f' 11 n 111 /1111 H i •» < \ i1»11111 < • 111 • 11 s. 11 I 111 • I I  i • \ V f u r 11 < I (11 11 i \ mh 
and conduct, misled the Plaintiffs into believing that they were trying to peribmi as 
agreed1, such thai legal A, (Uin would nnt h? mer"-J ^ z evidence establishes that t u 
\\ air i iiliiill mil iiiiinili111 .11 ilis.i i\( >n toproxiuw a ^ .... wate-
until late in 1995. Under such circumauui^c - ft • */ } 
Plaintiffs acted wi th in the statutory time frame once the) became aware of ihci* vauov v,A 
action Moreover , again Line W a n s lailed to marshal the evidence support ing the toll ing 
of the statute, nml I here Ion" lirni not riihn.nl <iii r i d d e n - .-. i^v lo the trial cour t ' s 
decision. 
Plaintiffs W a y n e and Miriam Lewis are entitled to the rel ief awarded them. While 
(In I x.\\ tscs admit tedly did not have a contract wi th the Warrs , they have a quit d d l 
acL.. • » > \ ater to winch the 
Cri t tendens we re enti t led by reason o f their contract wi th the Warrs , I il i iiiiii il 
proper ly rejected the W a r r s ' defense of lack of privity. 
I MI,I|K I|II jiiiiii ii 1 ill w ater awarded lo the I'ldintiils is not excessive. The 
evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiffs wnv promised water siiHiueni mi ini^m in 1 
acres. The only evidence in the record is that .079 cfs is that amount of water. 
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the quit claim deeds the Warrs finally had prepared were to convey that amount to 
Plaintiffs. The trial court's decision should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE 
OF MERGER. 
The Warrs argue at length that the trial court erred by not excluding all evidence 
of dealings prior to the execution of the warranty deeds and by not finding that the 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of merger.8 Appellant's Brief at 14-17. 
8
 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs note that the Warrs did not raise the doctrine of 
merger in their Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, Trial Brief, or in the 
Pretrial Order. R. 68-96,434-449,591-607,643-683,684-709. Moreover, contrary to their 
assertion in their brief, they did not raise the doctrine of merger at the commencement of 
trial. See, supra at 4-5, fii. 3. The Warrs' motion to exclude the evidence of prior dealings 
on the first day of trial was made only under the parol evidence rule. While counsel did 
object at times during the trial that the oral representations had merged into the deeds, the 
"doctrine of merger"' was never specifically mentioned until closing arguments. R. 953 at 
34; R. 955 at 118-120. The trial court was presented with no legal authority or detailed 
discussion on the doctrine of merger until that point (when counsel referred the court, in 
passing, to one case on merger). R. 955 at 118-120. Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs 
question whether the issue was adequately raised to preserve the issue for appeal. As this 
Court has stated, 
In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a 
party must first raise the issue in the trial court. That is, a trial 
court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue. A trial 
court has the opportunity to rule on an issue if the following 
three requirements are met: (1) 'the issue must be raised in a 
timely fashion"; (2) "the issue must be specifically raised;" and 
(3) a party must introduce "supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority." 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Company, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (quoting Hart 
v. Salt Lake County Comm % 945 P.2d 125,130 (Utah App. 1997) (other internal citations 
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The doctrine of merger is inapplicable in this case As this Court has stated: 
The doctrine of merger, which this Court recognizes, is 
applicable when the acts to be performed by the seller in a 
contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer. 
Execution and delivery of a deed by the seller then usually 
constitute full performance on his part, and his acceptance of 
the deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of that 
performance even though the estate conveyed may differ 
from that promised in the antecedent agreement. Therefore, 
in such a case, the deed is the final agreement and all prior 
terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and 
unenforceable. 
However, if the original contract calls for performance by the 
seller of some act collateral to conveyance of title, his 
obligations with respect thereto survive the deed and are not 
extinguished by it. Whether the terms of the contract are 
collateral, or are part of the obligation to convey and 
therefore unenforceable after delivery of the deed, depends to 
a great extent on the intent of the parties with respect thereto. 
When the seller's performance is intended by the parties to 
take place at some time after the delivery of the deed it 
cannot be said that it was contemplated by the parties that 
delivery of the deed would constitute full performance on the 
part of the seller, absent some manifest intent to the contrary 
Stubbs v. HemmerU 567 P.2d 168, 169-70 \\ Jf.illl il 11 mphasis mlrinl I, 
In Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners, 987 P.2d 3u" (Utah 1999), this 
Court iciicraied the foregoing standard for the application of the merger doctrine, and 
omitted), plaintiffs question whether the doctrine of merger was specifically raised at any 
point prior to closing arguments, as well as whether it was timely raised, in the context of 
this case which had been briefed extensively and tried for three days before the doctrine of 
merger was mentioned in closing arguments. 
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stated that'" covenants related to title and encumbrances are not considered to be 
collateral because they relate to the same subject matter as does the deed'" Id. at 35 
(quoting Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added)). In this 
case, there is no dispute that the warranty deeds make no mention of irrigation water. By 
definition, the contracts regarding the water do not "relate to the same subject matter as 
[do] the deed[s]." Id. 
Applied to the instant case, it is clear that merger is inapplicable to the contracts to 
provide and deliver the irrigation water. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the 
Warrs and the Plaintiffs intended that the Warrs' delivery of the water to the Subdivision 
would take place after the delivery of their deeds. The Warrs told the Plaintiffs that they 
would solve the problems with Bleazard and upgrade the pipeline such that the water 
could be delivered to the Subdivision. R. 953 at 173, 195; R. 954 at 29,46-47,50. All 
parties understood that this would take place after the delivery of the deeds. In the case 
of Wayne Reynolds, Hazel Warr made these assurances at the closing on his property. R. 
954 at 50. Heidi Thomas was told by Clayton Warr that because of the Bleazard case, he 
couldn't deliver the water at the time purchase, but that it would be provided and 
delivered thereafter, R. 173. Under such circumstances, "it cannot be said that it was 
contemplated by the parties that delivery of the deed would constitute full performance 
on the part of the seller " Dansie, 987 P.2d at 35 (quoting Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 
P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1977)). 
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The doctrine of merger simply does not apply : 5 contracts to provide and 
drlivn (li* wuli 1 I lii" Warrs' arguments on this point are therefore unavailing. The trial 
Cuuu uii - the doctrine ml 11 ir*ij»t-i 1 1 s 111 nil pin 11111<; ((mr I'lamtijis 
c h i i i - i s . ' ' • '" • ' • • • 
^ H E PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS, 
. , .lence rule as a defense to rlanitills1 clainr 
and contend that the trial c» * • - 1 1 1 • < H 1 1 1 ; 1 (• 1 s 
barred by that .rule at the commencement ui trial. However, the poioi evidence rule 
applies only where the parties have executed a writing which is intended to be a complete 
integrali<in 1  ii agi eenu , ...ida^c .-ale as a 
principle of contract interpretation ha"? v.-" • - • 
i"i, rules in the absence of fraud to e* - ...». contemporaneous conversations, statements, 
or representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
////t'^n/fiv/contrii I '" fhium fi r M" \ i" Swenson, H) ' II1" W 111(1 i (I liaJi 19SM Mi n lure, a 
court must first determine whether the wtifiiif was m'ni'l MI h\ "'i pir'1"',ll l» , 
* •' ^ration. In resolving this preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, indeed any 
; 1 .:. . . juict is admissible.7 
uuiciai cmorcement of 
writings that appear to be binding integrations but in laei ^ in the provision that 
all relevant evidence is admissible on the threshold issue of whether the writing was 
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adopted by the parties as an integration of their agreement. This appears to be so even if 
the writing clearly states it to be a complete an final statement of the parties' 
agreement." Id. (emphasis added). See also, Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Brothers 
Construction, 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1972). In this case, the trial court could not have determined, without hearing the 
evidence, whether or not the deeds were a complete integration of the understanding of 
the parties. It was not error to hear the relevant evidence and then make a finding that 
the deeds did not constitute a complete integration. 
The evidence clearly supports the finding that the parties in this case did not 
intend the instruments of conveyance to be a complete integration of their agreements. 
Perhaps the best evidence of this is Plaintiff Wayne Reynolds' testimony that, at the 
closing on his property, the Warrs assured him that although they could not deed and 
deliver the water to him at that time, it would be provided as soon as the Bleazard 
litigation was resolved. R. 954 at 50. Likewise, Heidi Thomas testified that Clayton 
Warr expressly stated that since the Warrs were still trying to resolve the dispute with 
Bleazard, the water would not be provided immediately, but that there would be 
irrigation water once that dispute was settled. R. 173. In addition, as the trial court aptly 
noted, it is compelling that the Warrs9 own children, who were also promised water, did 
not receive water rights in their warranty deeds, but instead were later given quit claim 
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deeds to the irrigation water (those deeds were prepared at roughly the same time as the 
deed hr " V i - , iMi"i,|' •Il ( I I'l.tmtills) K ,u'"lvi ,it 145-146; R. 955 at 
Under tiiwavvii cumstances, it is ticm llial llir piii'Mrs did rn I mlrmJ flic .si III.II ill 
deeds to be a complete integration,, of their agreements. Accordingly, the parol evidence 
rule does not apply, "lln trial court did not err in so concluding. 
111 I ' L A I N T I F K S * 1 J lAIMf II1 II I l k h I \ I'll I T * ^ 
F R A U D S . 
The Warrs next assert, that the Plaintiffs" claims are barred by the Statute of 
!:rauu.K which generally requires that an agreement conveying an interest in land be in 
•.us argument is also unavailing As tins Court 
has nuu;d, v'[t]he doctrine ui paii ; - :u\\w\ • 11 11,il 
iigieenienl. if it has been partially performer, :.ci,\ » i& Mc statute of frauds." 
Martin v, Sckoll, <>'/8 l\2d 274 (Utah 1983). In establishing this doctrine, courts 
iiili mini "to prr.rnl |lli» sl.ilnl' «»( iiviiul", lioiii) being made the means of perpetrating a '• 
fraud"1 or gross inequfr JCC iwvun* - I 
Welchman v Wood, ^ n ? / i ' \ 1-1 1 (Utah 19_-v The 'trial court correctly determined 
lli:.H flic doctrine applies A *<^ case. 
A performance or part performance is sufficient to satisfS Ihr slab ml\ • 11 11 «i i I I 
'the following elements are met: 
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First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; second, the 
acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; 
and third, the acts must be done in reliance on the contract. Such acts in 
reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been performed had the 
contract not existed [in other words, they must be exclusively referable to 
the contract] and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promisor 
would result in fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be 
inadequate. 
Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). 
The foregoing standard is easily met in the instant case. The terms of the oral 
agreement were clear and definite: in exchange for the Plaintiffs' payment of the 
purchase price of the lots, the Defendants would deliver sufficient water to irrigate five 
acres. Each Plaintiff paid the purchase price of his or her lot. Moreover, every Plaintiff, 
as well as the Crittendens, testified that he or she would not have purchased a five-acre 
lot without knowing where irrigation water would come from. R. 953 at 46, 62, 79, 103, 
119, 184, 206; R. 954 at 14, 18, 30, 40, 56. As Heidi Thomas testified, "Gary was an old 
farm boy, and he knew the importance of water with the property." R. 953 at 184. 
In addition, in reliance on the oral agreement, each Plaintiff made valuable 
improvements to the land. They built their homes on the lots, and Mel Spears, Fred 
Martinez, and Wayne Reynolds expended considerable time, effort, and money on 
installing a distribution pipeline so that the water could be delivered to their lots. The 
Plaintiffs would not have done so absent an agreement giving them rights to the water. 
Wayne Reynolds expressly stated that he would not have participated in installing the 
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p I I le across six lots a he had not understood that he owned the water rights. R. 954 at 
:
 „ . " " • • - •• . . . . • _ • . ' . . • • . . . • • . 
Even assuming, however, thai (In; ll.nrifiilV „i is in triiaiitT on ilk" , nil agreaiii uf 
.--i exclusively referable to the oral contract, the statute of frauds would still be 
JUS case, In lioth\. Roth, tins Court stated: 
[Wjhere the existence of the oral contract is established by the admission of 
the party resisting specific performance or by competent evidence 
independent of the acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts 
of part performance be exclusively referable to the oral contract is satisfied. 
MM V Jd 278 (Utah 1954) (emphasis added) Similarly, in Martin v. Scholl, the Court 
stated1 
[W]here the contract is admitted or [there are] strong independent acts 
which prove the contract exists, the requirement of exclusively referable 
acts has been relaxed , , , because the evidentiary concern is assuaged by 
either the admission or the independent acts. Consequently, the more 
conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less stringent the 
requirement of exclusively referable acts, 
678 P.2d ?,74 177 78 (\ HMII I <>811 i nnph.isis mldcd' 
In this case, the trial court properly found that, in addition to the Plaintiffs' acts In 
reliance on the agreement, there is independent evidence establishing the existence of the 
id ii iilidib, MUI Iliiili iiiii'1 'tAtlusivcl) iderable ' icquirementis satisfied. The 
Defendants' sworn affidavit in the 1CIKX Bleazard litigation admits Ihr v \ Ktnia niln m m ,jl 
contracts, stating: "We have sold six of the eleven lots in the Rock}/ Top Subdivision 
upon our representation that gravity flow Water would be provided to such lots from our 
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interest in the Rose Spring" (Emphasis added). While the Warrs argue that the 
foregoing sworn statement does not prove the existence of the oral contracts, Plaintiffs 
submit that, at the very least, the affidavit provides strong independent evidence of the 
contracts. 
But the affidavit is not the only independent evidence the trial court found 
probative of the oral contracts. The applications filed with the State Engineer's office 
over a long period of time, signed and sworn to under oath by the Warrs, repeatedly 
reference the Defendants' efforts to deliver the water from Rose Spring to the Rocky Top 
Subdivision.9 The Warts' representations to the Planning Commission also indicate their 
intent to develop the irrigation water in the Spring to be provided to lot purchasers. 
Finally, Howard Warr's testimony established that the Warrs essentially admitted they 
had originally agreed to provide the water as part of the purchase price of the lots, but 
9Taken together, the Warrs' 1988 affidavit and their applications filed with the State 
Engineer's office miay well constitute a group of writings sufficient to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. Under the statute of frauds, "[t]he writing [or group of writings] need not be made 
as a memorandum of the contract,. . . nor must it be made contemporaneously with the 
formation of the contract." Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wyo. 1990). In 
Richardson, a property report filed with a government agency which acknowledged a verbal 
agreement with another party was held to satisfy the statute of frauds. "When read in the 
context of the report," the court reasoned, 'this statement reasonably identifies the parties, 
the subject matter, amd their obligations to each other." Id. Likewise, the 1988 affidavit and 
documents filed with the State Engineer identify the parties as the Warrs and the owners of 
the lots, the subject matter as the water rights, and the Warrs' obligation to provide the 
water. The statute of frauds simply does not preclude the enforcement of the Warrs' oral 
agreement to provide the Water. 
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f*.. • ..i* was not important, since the Plaintiffs did not "have anything in writing,9' R. 953 
in (i iiiiiiiil III ill111 In null it, ( m i l un le t ! . • • 
It seems to me the simplest 'thing u *v naving said it 
i jr than saying "we don't ha\v ** ^
 0 " The easy thing 
say is "I did not ever tell you ilia*. >«va were getting-nor did anybod} ir 
presence tell you-that you were getting irritpilop water, and the wri 
statements only confirm that. 
['ft.ff'i 11 n l i i i l i lulu iilillf i ill illiulli ,\a>ilig l,">ui I L I U iniillmlig Hi Wi l l ing • '• 
R. 955 at 139-140. The court expressed the view that the Warrs niiinliM, u,s'ou Iia\c 
nothing in writing" was made to refute inconsistent >ral , p ±_ . —. w. -39. 
I a ken togeiL-. .naepenaent evidence over* i satisfies the "exclusive1 
referable11111 I 
addition, the quit claim u^^Uo orepared bv tlie Wan& m i lamiui* in ~ 
themselves probative of the oral contracts, Trial Exh. 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, If the W arcs 
truly believed that (he\ had onl> promised to make the water available for purchase, whj 'r 
w*i ill II linn, haw ii|iiiif i Ifiiiii ili/nls prqvurd ill lln Pl i imti lh1 iwiiics prim in even ofiLei 
the water for sale? The trial court did not err1 in determining that the evidence show 
acts of part, performance and strong independent evidence of the oral contracts, such that 
111 mi • s 111II in in 11 • i nil 11 a mi mi mi II i HI II i d n o t b a r p l a i n t i f f s " claims. 
Moreover, the Warrs fa E *ir burde- «: Miaiing the 
evidence on this point, and are therefore precluded from challenging this conclusion of 
the trial court. U. R. App. ™ ^A/™ f'L * party challenging a fact finding must first 
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marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding). See also Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1008 (Utah 1989); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1987) ("To successfully appeal a trial court's finding of fact," the challenger must 
"fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty . . . , the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced which supports the very findings the appellant resists.") (emphasis 
added). 
A. HAZEL WARR IS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS UNDER 
PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY AND ESTOPPEL. 
In an apparent attempt to bolster their statute of frauds argument, the Warrs have 
asserted that most of the Plaintiffs do not even allege that Hazel Warr promised to give 
them the water, but claim only to have received an oral promise from Clayton Warr, and 
then argue that the statute of frauds would nullify an otherwise enforceable promise by 
Clayton Warr to convey water rights, because the promise was not expressly reiterated by 
Hazel Warr. This argument is both factually and legally unfounded. First, the argument 
is based on a clear misrepresentation of the trial testimony of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
have testified that Hazel Warr was involved in the promises and representations made to 
them regarding water. R. 953 at 79-80,195-196; R. 954 at 6-9,27,45-46, 50. Lora 
Lee Crittenden testified that Clayton and Hazel acted as "equal partners" in their dealings 
with the Crittendens. R. 954 at 27. 
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Even if the evidence did not show that Hazel Warr made promises to the Plaintiffs 
regarding the irrigation water, the Warrs' argument would fail. Nothing in the cases 
•e Warn in MI|V|PINI II( IIMMI nr^nnienl negates in viipasttles the applicability of 
established principles of agency and estoppel,, both of which subject 1 Iii'/ei Win i h i 
liability r ; - • 
1. Clayton Warr and Howard Warr were agents of Hazel Warr Clayton 
Warr and Hi . * an age ml for 
I h / d 'JII in coiMiection with sales of lots in the Subdivision. Authority to act -is ,in 
agent for another can be created by "manifestations of consent of the principal lliat the 
iigciii "i.linul.il ,11,1 mi in I until ul (he principal " ll'-i itatement of Agency (Second) § 7, 
comment J ("our , ml < «iiii hv iiiaiiifcsleil In "wonk i ,nlli ,1* i, iiiinlin I, 111 11111111;> 
acquiescence." Id. at comment c. Howard Warr's actions in selling lots, including 
representations with regard to the water, were clearly known of and approved b) both his 
parent1. K "'l):ij .ill I,J.I, i lazel, on more than one occasion, heard her husband promising 
rights 1 HI " Wat"" In pnU:n!ml hi u i " f«" 1 • \ '«( 7 4 . M i l , III J M % ' |/ 'Uivi 1 H'I-'MI ,"" , .I>I 
46, 50. Hazel Warr, by her silence, mainlined consent to the actions of Clayton Warr 
and 1 loward Warr with regard to sales of lots, Hazel Warr also testified that her husband 
in Uil nil liii behalf in it1 11 liih, liPLi'iJiise she was occupied tending her 
principles. 
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In addition, by manifesting consent to potential buyers, Hazel Warr created 
apparent authority for her husband and her son Howard to act on her behalf. "Apparent 
authority results from a manifestation by a person that another is his agent, the 
manifestation being made to a third person." Restatement of Agency (Second) § 8. 
Hazel Warr was present on more than one occasion when Clayton Warr and/or Howard 
Warr were discussing lots and water rights with potential buyers; by remaining silent, she 
manifested her consent to their actions. Again, having known that the Plaintiffs believed 
that Clayton and Howard were acting as her agents, and allowing them to act on that 
belief, she is now bound by the actions taken by Clayton and Howard. 
2. Because of her actions, Hazel Warr is estopped from arguing that she is 
not bound by promises made to the Plaintiffs by Clayton Warr. 
A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction purported to be 
done on his account, is nevertheless subject to liability to persons who have 
changed their positions because of their belief that the transaction was entered into 
by or for him, if 
(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or 
(b) knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions 
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the facts. 
Restatement of Agency (Second) § 8B. A "change in position" is defined to include 
payment of money and expenditure of labor. Id. A person is subject to liability if he or 
she "remained silent with knowledge that another was purporting to contract on [her] 
behalf." Id 
In this case, the Plaintiffs "changed their positions because of their belief that the 
[promise to convey water rights] was entered into by" Hazel Warr. See id. Assuming for 
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the sake of argument that she never expressly promised to convey the water rights, she 
nevertheless "intentionally or carelessly caused such belief by her silence regarding the 
representations and promises made to Plaintiffs, of which she was clearly aware. The 
trial court did not err in rejecting this argument by the Warrs. Moreover, again, the 
Warrs failed to marshal the evidence on this point, and therefore have not raised an 
adequate challenge to the finding. See, e.g., Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1008 
(Utah 1989); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,444 (Utah App. 1998). 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The Warrs also argue that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the four-year statute 
of limitations for an action not founded on a written contract. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78-
12-25. However, the trial court correctly concluded otherwise. Under principles of 
equitable estoppel, the Warrs are precluded by their own conduct from asserting the 
statute of limitations as a defense. In addition, the Warrs failed to marshal the evidence 
on this point as well as others, and have therefore not adequately challenged the trial 
court's finding. See, e.g., Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1008 (Utah 1989); Wilde v. 
Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 1998). 
1. The Statute of Limitations was Tolled by the Warrs9 Misleading Conduct 
Utah courts have repeatedly held that a statute of limitations is tolled where the 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's 
misleading conduct, or where "the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
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application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing 
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." Envirotech Corp. 
v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 492 (Utah App. 1994). See also Warren v. Provo City, 838 
P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) (citing Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981); 
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978); Rice v. Granite School 
Dist, 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969)). The Plaintiffs submit that, under either of the 
foregoing theories, the statute of limitations was tolled in this case. 
This Court has stated: "[A] defendant who misleads a plaintiff or causes delay in 
the bringing of a cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a 
defense to the action." Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah 1994) 
(internal citations omitted). Applied to the instant case, it is clear that the Warrs are 
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense, due to their continual 
misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs regarding the water. Specifically, after conveying the 
deeds without the water rights, the Warrs continued to assure the Plaintiffs that the water 
would be provided as soon as delivery became possible. For a number of years after the 
Plaintiffs purchased their lots, the Warrs told them that the water could not yet be 
delivered because of the pending litigation with Bleazard and various problems with the 
pipeline. Thereafter, the Warrs represented that the deeds were being prepared. 
Throughout this time, the Warrs acknowledged their obligation to provide and deliver the 
water, and led the Plaintiffs to believe that they would do so as promised once the 
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ownership of the Spring was adjudicated and the delivery system was in place. 
Once the Bleazard litigation concluded, the Warrs clearly manifested an intention 
to provide the water. They began working to solve problems connected with delivering 
the water. The Plaintiffs assisted them in this effort, contributing both time and money to 
the project. Several Plaintiffs joined together with the Warrs to purchase materials 
needed, rented a backhoe, and physically worked together to install a pipeline. They did 
so believing that their efforts would enable them to use the water to which they had 
already purchased the rights. During this time, the Warrs never indicated to the Plaintiffs 
that they did not intend to provide the water, or that the Plaintiffs would be charged an 
additional fee for the water. 
In late 1995, the Warrs first informed the Plaintiffs that quit claim deeds had been 
prepared conveying the water rights as originally agreed. However, the Warrs now 
stated, for the very first time, that the Plaintiffs would have to pay an additional $2,500 
for the water rights, reasoning that they "had to make some money out of this." The 
Plaintiffs were understandably outraged, given that they had already paid for the water 
rights, and no prior mention of any additional charge for the water rights had ever been 
made. When the Plaintiffs declined to pay the additional $2,500 for the quit claim deeds, 
the Warrs refused to deliver the deeds. This was the first time in all their years of dealing 
with the Plaintiffs that the Warrs expressly disavowed their obligations under their oral 
agreements with the Plaintiffs. Until this event in late 1995, the Warrs led the Plaintiffs 
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to believe that they would perform as agreed. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs1 Complaint was 
filed well within the four-year statute. The trial court correctly determined that the 
Plaintiffs acted with "reasonable dispatch once they determined that remedies were really 
not going to [be] given to them as they had originally anticipated, and they did that 
within a timely fashion." R. 955 at 148. 
2. The Statute of Limitations was Tolled Under the Exceptional 
Circumstances Exception. 
Additionally,, the evidence also shows that the statute of limitations was tolled in 
this case under the exceptional circumstances exception. Under that doctrine, the 
plaintiff must make an initial showing that he or she did not know, and could not 
reasonably have known, of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim 
within the time prescribed by statute. The court then engages in the following balancing 
test to determine whether the case presents exceptional circumstances: "Whether the 
hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances of 
the case outweighs any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by 
the passage of time." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, before late 1995, the Plaintiffs could not reasonably have known that 
the Warrs would deny their contractual obligation to provide the water, given the Warrs1 
repeated representations that they intended to deliver the water. Further, the application 
of the balancing test set forth above clearly weighs in the Plaintiffs' favor. The trial court 
expressly found that the Warrs were not prejudiced by the passage of time in this case. 
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R. 955 at 150. By contrast, the hardship that the Plaintiffs will suffer if the statute of 
limitations is applied to bar their claim is substantial-they will be permanently deprived 
of valuable water rights for which they have paid, as well as the beneficial use of the 
five-acre lots they now own.10 For this additional reason, the statute of limitations was 
tolled. In short, due to the Warrs1 conduct, the statute of limitations cannot equitably be 
raised as a valid defense to Plaintiffs' action. The trial court properly rejected this 
defense. 
V. PLAINTIFFS WAYNE D. LEWIS AND MIRIAM LEWIS SUCCEEDED TO THE 
CLAIMS OF HOWARD A. CRITTENDEN AND LORA LEE CRITTENDEN. 
The Warrs have argued that Plantiffs Wayne and Miriam Lewis are not entitled to 
the irrigation water sold to the Crittendens, because they did not purchase their lot 
directly from the Warrs, and they were informed by a realtor at the time of purchase that 
they were receiving no water rights, but that they could purchase water rights from the 
Warrs for $2500. The facts relied on by the Defendants are irrelevant. The Lewises 
received from the Crittendens and recorded a quit-claim deed conveying to the Lewises 
all the Crittendens' interest in the water rights originally promised to and paid for by the 
10Plaintiff Wayne Reynolds would perhaps suffer the greatest hardship. Because of 
a moratorium on well drilling, he has been unable to build a home on his lot, and because 
he has no water, he cannot use his lot to grow any crops or raise game birds. Moreover, he 
cannot even sell his lot, since there is simply not a market for five acre desert lots with 
absolutely no water. Clearly, this case presents an exceptional circumstance, where the 
application of the statute of limitations would be irrational and unjust. 
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Crittendens. Trial Exh. 131. Accordingly, the claim for the water rights is now vested in 
the Lewises, and they are entitled to the irrigation water. 
VI. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO CONVEY AN 
EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF WATER. 
The Warrs' final argument is that the Judgment entered by the trial court requires 
them to convey an excessive amount of water. However, the only evidence in the record 
supports the Judgment. The record plainly established that Plaintiffs were promised 
sufficient water to irrigate five acres. The record also established that Plaintiffs (with the 
exception of Wayne Reynolds) are able to irrigate one quarter of an acre with their 
culinary wells. The Warrs' own expert witness, Mr. Vem Loveless, testified that using 
the calculations employed by the State Engineer's office, .079 cfs would irrigate four and 
three-quarter acres. R. 954 at 169-170, 182. Together with the Plaintiffs' rights to 
appropriate .015 cfs from their culinary wells and to irrigate one quarter of an acre with 
that water, the .079 cfs would give the Plaintiffs the amount of water the State Engineer's 
office allocates for the irrigation of five acres. This was the amount used in the first quit 
claim deeds in Plaintiffs' names (and in the names of the Warrs' children) prepared by 
Mr. Loveless at Hazel Warr's instructions. Trial Exh. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88. 
(Appellees' Supplemental Appendix at "A"). 
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these reasons, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the judgment in their favor be 
affirmed 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I_day of December, 2000. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
BV: Huu \K?t^4^jJLj 
Anthony L. Rampton 
Marci Rechtenbach 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence at trial and in the record clearly established that the Warrs entered 
into oral contracts with the Plaintiffs (and in the Lewises' case, the Crittendens) to 
provide the water as part of the purchase price of the lots. The Warrs themselves have 
testified in prior litigation that they represented that irrigation water would be provided 
with the lots they had sold. Notably, in that litigation, the Warrs' retaining the water 
appeared to depend in part upon the existence of the agreements with the Plaintiffs and 
other lot owners. The Warrs' present denial of their promises, together with their prior 
sworn testimony in the Bleazard case, and their representations to the Planning 
Commission and the State Engineer, make one fact abundantly clear: the Warrs will say 
whatever they deem necessary to hold on to this irrigation water. 
It is noteworthy that the Warrs did not initially deny the existence of the oral 
contracts; they simply stated that the Plaintiffs didn't have "anything in writing." The 
Warrs have engaged in a blatant and deliberate attempt to use the statute of frauds and 
the statute of limitations to perpetuate a gross inequity, and these defenses should not be 
upheld by this Court. Likewise, the defenses of lack of privity of contract, the parol 
evidence rule, the doctrine of merger, and the laws of joint ownership do not provide a 
valid basis for the Warrs to escape enforcement of the contracts they made with the 
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are entitled to receive the water rights, the conveyance and 
delivery of which are long overdue. The trial court did not err in so concluding. For 
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( day of December, 2000,1 caused to be mailed. I hereby certify that on the J_  f r, ,  s  t   il , 
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the following: 
Denise A. Dragoo 
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Addenda 
Addendum 1 
Recorded at Request of_ 
at . M. Fee Paid $_ 
by Dep. Book Page Ref,: 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to MELVIN L. SPEARS AND SANDRA S. 
SPEARS grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN 
DOLLARS, the following described water rights in Tooele County, State of 
Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, 
'lei**-.. t l i* . i,M 
County of Tooele ) fi^cl^ ^iSS^K^ 
***. ^ . On the^3of /jLr^ A D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and 4IAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: sy/, ^ s > 
0/23fa /t%m0/&&*. 
EXHIBIT 
80 WAR000142 
Addendum 2 
Recorded at Request of 
at . M. Pee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to WAYNE V. REYNOLDS grantee of Tooele 
County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the following described 
water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
81 
WAR000144 
Addendum 3 
Recorded at Request of 
at . M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to FREDDY MARTINEZ and KAREN 
MARTINEZ grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN 
DOLLARS, the following described water rights in Tooele County, State of 
Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ). 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
82 
WAR000152 
Addendum 4 
Recorded at Request of 
at . M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to GARY R. THOMAS grantee of Tooele 
County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the following described 
water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7,9%) of Change Apphcation No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
83 
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Addendum 5 
Recorded at Request of 
at . M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.: 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to CATHY N. WARR JOHNSON grantee of 
Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the following 
described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
84 
Addendum 6 
Recorded at Request of 
at . M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to CECIL B. JONES and TERESA M. JONES 
grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the 
following described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
85 
Addendum 7 
Recorded at Request of 
at . M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to CLIFFORD R. RUBEN and TOUJAM 
RUBEN grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN 
DOLLARS, the following described water rights in Tooele County, State of 
Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change AppUcation No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) S3. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
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Addendum 8 
Recorded at Request of 
at . M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:, 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to EDWARD K WARR and LISA G. WARR 
grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the 
following described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
87 
WARanaAA* 
Addendum 9 
Recorded at Request of 
at __. M. Fee Paid $ . 
by Dep. Book Page Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, grantors, of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIM to HOWARD A. WARR and LINDA Z. WARR 
grantees of Tooele County, State of Utah for the sum of TEN DOLLARS, the 
following described water rights in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
Seven and nine tenths percent (7.9%) of Change Application No. a-12993 
which represents 0.079 cfs from Rose Spring AKA Bryan Springs. 
Witness the hand of said grantors, this day of , A. D. 1993 
Signed in the presence of ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ss. 
County of Tooele ) 
On the of , A. D. 1993, personally appeared before me 
EDWARD C. WARR and HAZEL V. WARR, the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires Address: 
EXHIBIT 
88 
NFUCIS RESPONSE SHEET 
To: ~Tohi* / Conflicts Coordinator Date: ///tfg/flD 
From: Conflict Coordinator / File Room 
Notice Number: Jff-/ //fatf/OFi 
Client: <^}jft KJ KllMJ^ 
The conflicts of interest computer check has been completed on the attached conflict e-
mail. Please note the following: 
a No conflicts were found 
"a^Possible conflicts were found - See attached list 
This engagement has been: 
Id Accepted* 
X \ J^ Determined no conflict exists, or 
\ a Conflicts have been resolved 
• Rejected, but we have acquired enough information that we may not be able to 
represent adverse parties. Retain these parties in the Conflicts database. 
• Rejected. No need to maintain information in Conflicts database. 
• Pending 
* ATTENTION: Provide any additional related party names. 
Attorney Signature / Date 
PLEASE RETURN THE ATTACHED FORM 
Note: 
• If rejected, return this form to Conflicts coordinator 
• If accepted, return originals to Conflicts coordinator and attach copy to 
new engagement and send to Billing Specialist 
From: 
To: 
Date: 
Subject: 
Conflicts2 (tch) (Conflicts) 
All Attorneys; All Paralegals; Conflicts2 
Tue, Nov 28, 2000 11:40 AM 
CONFLICT CHECK: INITIALS: TCH DATE: 11/28/00 
• 
• • " 
A// 
Conflicts Checked 
Conflict Response Sheet 
Done 
Data Entered 
Accepted, Declined, Pending 
entered into Database 
CLIENT: JEFFREY KNOWLES 
RELATED PARTY(IES): 
PRIOR OR OTHER COUNSEL: x / / / / 
ADVERSE PARTY(IES): THE RANCHES L.C. V ^ / / y / 
ADVERSE RELATED PARTY(IES): SCOTT KIRKLAND and STAN RICKS 
ADVERSE PARTY ADDRESS: 
OPPOSING FIRM: 
. OPPOSING ATTORNEY: 
DESCRIPTION OF WORK: REPRESENT CLIENT IN ACTION TO FORECLOSE ON TRUST DEED 
NOTE 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS: 
QUALIFIES FOR NEW BUSINESS CREDIT? (YES OR NO): 
Do NOT reply if you have no conflicts. If you DO have conflicts, please report them directly to the attorney 
whose initials appear in the subject line above. Do NOT reply to conflicts. 
CC: All Secretaries 
Conflicts Report 
Notice Number 
Engagement Date 
Prior/Other Counsel 
Opposing Attorney 
Pending/Accepted 
Comments 
Work Description 
15847 
09/28/94 
A 
None known 
File and purs 
Attorney JER 
Completion Date 
Archive Date 
Opposing Firm 
More Information to Follow N 
ue motion to dismiss lawsuits as time barred. 
First Name 
Scott 
Christy 
George 
Helen 
Evelyne 
Last Name 
Kirkland 
Kirkland 
Hermestroff 
Hermestroff 
Broitman 
Client 
Adverse 
Code 
Related 
Party 
Code 
c 
c 
a 
a 
a 
Entity 
Type SIC 
ind 99 
ind 99 
ind 99 
ind 99 
ind 99 
Printed: 11/28/00 Page 1 
Conflicts Report 
Notice Number 100134 
Engagement Date 10/13/92 
Prior/Other Counsel 
Opposing Attorney 
Pending/Accepted a 
Comments 
Attorney 
Completion Date 
Archive Date 
Opposing Firm 
More Information to Follow 
rlh 
Work Description collection 
First Name 
Stan 
John 
Last Name 
Holliday Affaire 
Ricks 
Jesperson 
Client 
Adverse 
Code 
unk 
off 
off 
Related 
Party 
Code 
c 
crp 
crp 
Entity 
Type SIC 
cor 99 
ind 99 
ind 
Printed: 11/28/00 Page 1 
